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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 
The primary issue raised by this appeal is whether 
Centre County violated the appellants' civil rights by 
excluding them from participation in the County's foster 
care program because their son has HIV and AIDS, and 
because of their race. This case began when appellants 
John and Mary Doe, an interracial couple with an HIV - 
positive son named Adam,1 appr oached Centre County's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Names have been changed to preserve confidentiality. 
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Foster Child Program, seeking to become foster parents. 
County officials responded by adopting a policy providing 
that foster families whose members have "serious infectious 
diseases" may care only for children with the same disease. 
The policy would permit the Does to car e for uninfected 
children only if the Does agreed to r elease information 
regarding their son and the biological par ents executed a 
written consent releasing the County fr om potential 
liability. The Does refused to agree to the policy and filed 
suit, alleging disability discrimination in violation of, among 
other statutes, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and racial 
discrimination in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. The Does sought invalidation of the policy, 
approval as foster parents, and compensatory and punitive 
damages. The District Court granted summary judgment to 
the County on the disability discrimination claims, 
reasoning that the policy was justified under the ADA's 
direct threat exception since foster children placed with the 
Does could sexually assault Adam and contract HIV . 
 
Because we believe that a reasonable fact finder could 
find that placement of at least some foster childr en in the 
Does' home would not entail a significant risk of harm, we 
will reverse. Furthermore, we will r everse the District 
Court's judgment that none of the Does' racial 
discrimination claims are ripe for adjudication. However, we 
will affirm the District Court's decision that the individual 
County officials are entitled to qualified immunity. We will 
also affirm the District Court's holding that county 




The appellants, John Doe, a 51 year old African- 
American man, and Mary Doe, a 52 year old Caucasian 
woman, are married, and live in State College, Centre 
County, Pennsylvania, with their two adopted sons, Adam, 
11 years old, and Steven, 12. 
 
Over the years, Mary has dedicated herself to the care of 
foster children with special needs. From 1972 to 1989, she 
cared for 8 foster children and eventually adopted 7 of 
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them. Adam and Steven, who came to Mary as infants, were 
the last two children she adopted. Adam came to Mary with 
HIV and AIDS, which he contracted from his birth mother. 
Another of Mary's adopted sons was blind, retar ded and 
had cerebral palsy. Others had been physically and 
sexually abused. Her efforts have earned her several 
awards, including Foster Parent of the Y ear by the New 
York State Foster Parents' Association. 
 
Overcoming a troubled youth and time in prison, John 
earned a college degree and became active in church and 
community affairs. He has served as a pr ogram worker in 
residential group homes for persons with mental 
retardation and is currently a cab driver. He had no 
children of his own, but upon marrying Mary, he accepted 
her children, including Adam, into his home. 
 
AIDS (Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndr ome) is the last 
stage of progression of the HIV virus (Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus). HIV infects and destroys specific 
white blood cells, known as T lymphocytes, that support 
the body's immune system. As the virus progr esses, 
infected persons become more and more susceptible to 
opportunistic infections and diseases, and, although 
persons with HIV can live for years, the virus has no cure. 
See generally Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 633-37 
(1998) (describing the course of HIV and AIDS in detail, 
with references to medical texts and authorities). 
 
Due to the virus, Adam suffers eating and digestion 
problems. He receives nourishment thr ough a feeding tube. 
He has symptoms of autism and permanent lear ning 
deficits, including difficulties speaking and expressing 
himself. Unable to care for himself, Adam r elies on his 
parents and others to assist him with eating, cleaning, and 
personal hygiene. 
 
Prior to 1996, HIV and AIDS severely thr eatened Adam's 
health. His eating and digestive problems wer e far more 
severe, and he weighed only 37 pounds at the age of six in 
March 1996. At that time, doctors began aggr essive drug 
therapy that has suppressed Adam's HIV viral load to 
undetectable levels.2 Today, despite his physical limitations, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Viral load refers to the level of virus in an HIV-positive person's 
blood. 
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Adam has good overall health, and suffers no greater risk 
of opportunistic infection than a child without HIV . 
 
Adam attends school classes for children with special 
needs. School officials keep his HIV-positive status 
confidential and do not require disclosure of that status to 
parents of HIV-negative students. Adam has not 
transmitted HIV to his brother, Steven, nor to any children 
with whom he attends school. 
 
The probability of HIV transmission from Adam to others 
is a crucial issue in this case. During proceedings, the 
District Court entertained testimony about HIV and AIDS 
from two medical experts, Joel H. Hersh, an expert in 
Public Health Administration, and Robert M. Swenson, 
M.D., a physician and expert in the treatment of infectious 
diseases. The following discussion proceeds fr om their 
testimony and related affidavits. See generally Doe v. 
County of Centre, 60 F. Supp. 2d 417, 419-26 (M.D. Pa. 
1999) (summarizing portions of the medical evidence) 
[hereinafter Doe I]; Doe v. County of Centre, 80 F. Supp. 2d 
437, 441-44 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (same) [hereinafter Doe II]. 
 
HIV is transmitted only through absorption of infected 
blood or sexual secretions into the bloodstr eam or mucous 
membranes of an uninfected person. Bodily fluids such as 
sweat, tears, or saliva, while containing minute amounts of 
HIV, pose little to no risk of infection, nor does skin contact 
with HIV-positive blood, unless the skin is br oken or has 
open wounds. Thus, the chance of HIV transmission fr om 
casual contact is virtually nonexistent. Nor mal sibling 
fighting and roughhousing present negligible risk of 
transmission. In fact, Dr. Hersh testified that out of the 
21,000 AIDS cases in Pennsylvania, there ar e no reported 
cases of virus transmission due to familial contact or 
fighting. Even intense physical activities cr eate little risk of 
infection. For example, Dr. Swenson noted that a study 
involving football players found that the risk of HIV 
transmission was one in every 85 million violent contacts. 
 
The two primary modes of infection are thr ough the use 
of infected hypodermic needles and thr ough unprotected 
sex. According to Dr. Swenson, the pr obability of HIV 
transmission through sexual activity varies depending on 
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the activity involved, the specific roles of the infected and 
uninfected persons in the sexual activity, and the viral load 
of the infected person. Certain generalities apply. For 
example, the lower an HIV-positive person's viral load, the 
lower the transmission risk. In addition, during sexual 
intercourse, HIV is more easily transmitted from an 
insertive to a receptive partner than fr om a receptive to an 
insertive partner. 
 
Relying on his professional experience and the prevailing 
medical research, Dr. Swenson testified as to the 
probability of transmission in non-consensual male-to-male 
sexual activity. These risk findings rely on medical models 
of disease transmission based on observations of patients, 
rather than on actual controlled tests. Accor ding to Dr. 
Swenson, the probability of transmission to a person with 
HIV who performs oral sex on an infected partner is low, 
about 1 in 2500 for each occurrence. The pr obability of 
transmission from a receptive HIV-positive partner to an 
insertive HIV-negative partner in anal sex is about 1 in 
1666. However, the probability of transmission from an 
insertive HIV-positive partner to a receptive HIV-negative 
partner under these circumstances is much higher, about 
1 in 120. 
 
The appellees in this case are Centre County, the Office 
of Children and Youth Services of Centr e County ("CYS"), 
and the Board of Commissioners of Centr e County ("County 
Board"), as well as individual CYS officials Terry Watson, 
Carol Smith, and Lisa Rice. We will r efer to the appellees 
collectively as the "County." Centre County provides a 
foster care program for children in need of temporary or 
permanent placements outside the homes of their biological 
or custodial families. CYS operates the foster car e program 
and is obligated to follow all applicable federal and 
Pennsylvania laws. In particular, CYS operates under a 
statutory duty to investigate foster parent applicants in 
order to preserve the physical and emotional health of 
foster children. See, e.g., 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 6344(d) 
(requiring foster programs to investigate prospective foster 
parents for criminal activity or child abuse). Both Centre 
County and CYS receive federal funds, and the foster care 
program receives a portion of these funds. 
 
                                7 
  
Terry Watson is the Director of CYS, and oversees the 
foster care program. Carol Smith is the Assistant Director 
of CYS, bearing ultimate responsibility and oversight for the 
training of foster parents. Lisa Rice is a foster home 
specialist employed by CYS. She helps select and counsel 
foster families. Tom Groninger, who is not an appellee in 
this case, is an employee of CYS who perfor ms home 
studies for prospective foster parents. According to Carol 
Smith, there are several steps in a foster parent 
application: (1) an initial phone call; (2) a pr eliminary home 
study by Groninger; (3) six weeks of pr e-service training for 
foster parents; (4) a meeting between the foster parents and 
Lisa Rice, and a final assessment; and (5) a meeting 
between Rice and Smith to approve or disappr ove the 
application. 
 
In January 1998, the Does applied to become foster 
parents under the CYS foster care pr ogram. During the 
preliminary home study, the Does disclosed to Groninger 
that Adam had HIV and AIDS. Prior to the Does' 
application, CYS officials had never knowingly placed a 
child in a foster home where someone had HIV , and 
therefore had no policy to address the limitations, if any, 
applying to such a home. The County claims that CYS, 
looking for guidance, investigated the policies of other 
counties throughout Pennsylvania. CYS officials found 
some infectious disease policies in other counties, but claim 
that none addressed the specific situation of placing an 
HIV-negative child in a foster home wher e HIV is present. 
 
Amici curiae, the American Public Health Association and 
others, challenge the County's claims of investigation, citing 
numerous policies from other jurisdictions. These policies 
generally state that family services agencies should neither 
apply blanket prohibitions against placing HIV -positive 
foster children with HIV-negative childr en, nor segregate 
HIV-positive foster children from HIV-negative children 
without analyzing the particular circumstances of each 
case. See Dep't of Pub. Welfar e, Commonwealth of Pa., 
Children, Youth and Families Bulletin: HIV/AIDS Policy 9 
(1989) (unofficial draft policy) ("HIV positive children should 
not be segregated in day care facilities, foster homes, group 
homes, residential placements, or institutions based on 
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their HIV status alone"); The Dep't of Servs. for Children, 
Youth and their Families, State of Del., Policy and Procedure 
Manual: Communicable Diseases S 103 (IV)(F) (1998) 
("Except where the presence or risk of[HIV infection from 
a foster child] presents specialized car e needs, the presence 
or risk of [HIV] should not be the mitigating factor in the 
placement decision"); N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Servs., 
Field Operations Casework Policy and Procedur es Manual 
S 1502.10 (1999) (when placing HIV-positive foster children, 
"[s]iblings and children of any age may be placed together 
in the same household, unless a physician advises 
otherwise"); Child Welfare League of Am., Meeting the 
Challenge of HIV Infection in Family Foster Car e 18-22 
(1991); Child Welfare League of Am., Serving HIV-Infected 
Children, Youth, and their Families: A Guide for Residential 
Group Care Providers 29-33 (1989). 
 
The policies cited are not, however, entirely on point, 
since they apply to the placement of HIV-positive foster 
children into foster homes rather than the placement of 
HIV-negative children into foster homes where HIV is 
present. Having reviewed these polices, we conclude that 
only the policy of the Philadelphia Department of Human 
Services applies to the present situation. That policy 
declares that "[t]he Department . . . does not discriminate 
in . . . its recruitment or development of kinship caregivers, 
foster parents, adoptive parents, and contracted providers 
on the basis of . . . [their] living or[being] perceived as living 
with HIV/AIDS." See Children and Youth Div., Phila. Dep't 
of Human Servs., Policy Manual SS 1010, 5200 (emphasis 
added). 
 
After its investigation, CYS officials examined the records 
of Centre County's foster care program. They found a 
pattern of physical and sexual abuse among foster children: 
 
       As of March 31, 1999, CYS had 125 childr en in 
       placement. Of those children: 
 
       (a) 49% (61 children) had behavioral or emotional 
       problems, 
 
       (b) 24% (30 children) had been victims only of sexual 
       abuse[,] 
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       (c) 5% (6 children) were perpetrators only of sexual 
       abuse[,] and 
 
       (d) 7% (9 children) were both victims and perpetrators 
       of sexual abuse. 
 
Doe II, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 441 (inter nal quotations and 
citation omitted). According to CYS officials, a "perpetrator," 
as used in (c), is a child who has assaulted another child 
sexually, but CYS's definition of "assault" includes such 
activities as fondling and disrobing others. 
 
CYS officials further concluded that, given the emergency 
nature of foster child placement, there was inadequate time 
to assess each foster child for behavioral or emotional 
problems prior to placement. While able to identify some 
sexual perpetrators, CYS officials found that a number of 
foster children were not identified as sexual perpetrators 
until after foster placement. Especially disturbing were 
documented instances of sexual assault by foster children 
on other children in foster homes. 
 
Motivated by the concern that a foster child might 
sexually assault Adam, and thereby contract HIV , CYS 
Director Watson developed the following policy regarding 
the placement of children when infectious diseases are 
present: 
 
       C) Placement Of Children With Ser ious Infectious 
       Diseases 
 
       . . . If a child with a serious infectious disease is placed 
       in a foster home, or if there is a family member of the 
       foster family who has a serious infectious disease, only 
       children with the same serious infectious disease will 
       be considered for placement in that home. The only 
       exception to this policy would be for a parent/guardian 
       of a child in the care and custody of C&YS to sign an 
       informed consent for the placement of their non- 
       infected child in such a home. . . . For this exception 
       to occur, the foster parents would have to voluntarily 
       agree to release information to the child's parents that 
       a member of the foster family has been diagnosed with 
       a specific serious infectious disease. 
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The County Board adopted this policy and dir ected CYS to 
carry out its terms.3 
 
Meanwhile, Lisa Rice informed the Does that Adam's HIV 
might present a problem for foster par ent approval. 
According to plaintiffs' version of events, Rice also alluded 
to racial considerations, telling Yolanda Lollis of the AIDS 
Law Project in Pennsylvania,4 as well as Mary Doe, that the 
HIV issue was irrelevant since CYS did not have any 
African-American foster children to place with the Does. 
During later proceedings, Rice explained that CYS uses 
race as a factor in placing children because it tries to 
replicate a foster child's original home envir onment. Racial 
continuity minimizes disruption and change in the child's 
life. Rice also acknowledged the possibility of racial 
animosity between the interracial foster par ents and 
Caucasian biological or custodial parents. 
 
Given the HIV controversy, the Does' application stalled 
without a formal evaluation of their fitness as foster 
parents. After delay and mutual recriminations, CYS 
officials sent the Does a formal letter on December 18, 
1998 stating that: 
 
       we are prepared to consider appr oval of you as 
       available foster parents for any HIV-infected child. If 
       you would like to be approved for other childr en, per 
       our policy, you would need to sign a consent allowing 
       CYS to disclose to any child's parents that a member 
       of your family/household is HIV-infected. In turn, the 
       parent must sign an informed consent allowing their 
       child to be placed in your home. 
 
The Does refused to consent to this arrangement. 
 
On April 28, 1999, the Does sued Centre County, CYS, 
and the County Board, as well as CYS officials Watson, 
Smith, and Rice, individually and in their official capacities. 
The Does charged the County with disability discrimination 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The quoted passage is actually provision IV.C in a policy containing 
numerous provisions. Nevertheless, for ease we will refer to this 
provision as the County's policy. 
 
4. Lollis had provided legal advice to the Does in connection with this 
case. 
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in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
42 U.S.C. SS 12131-34 [hereinafter"Title II of the ADA"], 
and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.S 794; 
racial discrimination in violation of Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. S 2000d-1-7; and racial and 
disability discrimination in violation of the equal protection 
guarantees under the United States Constitution, pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. S 1983. They also filed a motion for injunctive 
relief. With respect to remedies, the Does sought 
invalidation of the County's infectious disease policy, their 
approval as foster parents, and compensatory and punitive 
damages. 
 
On June 22, 1999, the District Court held a one-day 
hearing on the Does' preliminary injunction motion. It was 
during this hearing that nearly all of the r ecord in this case 
was developed. 
 
On July 12, 1999, the County moved to dismiss the Does' 
complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to 
state a claim, arguing that: (a) the Policy was valid since 
Adam's AIDS posed a direct and significant threat to foster 
children; (b) the Does' racial discrimination claims were 
unripe; (c) the individual defendants were entitled to 
qualified immunity; and (d) punitive damages wer e 
unavailable. Within its motion, the County r eferred to 
matters outside of the complaint, specifically r elying on 
evidence from the June 22, 1999 preliminary injunction 
hearing. 
 
The District Court dealt with the preliminary injunction 
motion and the 12(b)(6) motion in several related steps. By 
order dated August 30, 1999, the District Court denied the 
preliminary injunction motion, finding that the Does failed 
to prove a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. 
Doe I, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 426. By or der dated October 13, 
1999, the District Court, believing that the evidence from 
the hearing sufficed to resolve the case, accepted and 
considered the County's proffer ed extrinsic evidence. 
Following Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), the Court r easoned that the 
inclusion of extrinsic evidence mandated the conversion of 
the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. 
See generally Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 F .3d 573, 578 (3d Cir. 
1996) (outlining procedure for conversion). The Court 
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therefore gave the parties 16 days tofile briefs, affidavits, 
and other materials that might be relevant. The Does 
objected to conversion, arguing that discovery had been 
inadequate. They also argued that, in any case, the Court 
should deny summary judgment on the available r ecord. 
 
On February 1, 2000, the District Court granted 
summary judgment to the County on all claims. Doe II, 80 
F. Supp. 2d 437. It held that Adam's HIV posed a 
significant risk to foster children who might sexually 
assault Adam, and that therefore, the dir ect threat 
exception to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act applied, 
justifying discrimination via the infectious disease policy. 
The District Court also held that the individual CYS officials 
were entitled to qualified immunity because any right the 
Does had was not clearly established, and, further , that 
County government entities were immune fr om punitive 
damages. Lastly, the Court found that the Does' racial 
discrimination claims were unripe. The Does appealed the 
order granting summary judgment for the County, 5 and we 




We exercise plenary review over the District Court's grant 
of summary judgment, Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 
F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988), and we independently apply 
the same standard applicable to district courts, Olson v. 
Gen. Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(citations omitted). Federal Rule of Civil Pr ocedure 56(c) 
directs that summary judgment is appropriate "if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law." In following this directive, a court must take the 
facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 
the Does, and draw all reasonable infer ences in their favor. 




5. The Does have not contested the denial of their motion for a 
preliminary injunction. 
 




We first consider the Does' contention that the District 
Court erred in dismissing their disability discrimination 
claims brought under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act. As a starting point, the 
protections found in the ADA and in the Rehabilitation Act 
are interpreted similarly, and, in this case, are identical. 
See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 632 (using statutory construction 
to conclude that the Court should "construe the ADA to 
grant at least as much protection as pr ovided by the 
regulations implementing the Rehabilitation Act"). 
Therefore, except where necessary, we refer only to Title II 
of the ADA, with the understanding that both statutes are 
implicated. 
 
Title II of the ADA provides, in pertinent part, that: 
 
       no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason 
       of such disability, be excluded from participation in or 
       be denied the benefits of the services, pr ograms, or 
       activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
       discrimination by any such entity. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 12132; see also 29 U.S.C.S 794(a) (Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act) (prohibition on disability 
discrimination in federal programs). The ADA describes a 
disability as "a physical or mental impair ment that 
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities 
of [an] individual." 42 U.S.C. S 12102(2); see also 29 U.S.C. 
705(20)(B) (same under the Rehabilitation Act). Adam's HIV 
clearly constitutes a disability since it is a physical 
impairment, 28 C.F.R. S 35.104 (defining "physical 
impairment"), that substantially limits several of Adam's 
major life activities, such as talking, walking, and digestion, 
28 C.F.R. S 35.104 (defining "major life activities"). See also 
45 C.F.R. S 84.3(j) (defining physical impairment and major 
life activities under the Rehabilitation Act); Bragdon, 524 
U.S. at 637, 641 (holding that HIV, even in the so-called 
asymptomatic phase, is an impairment which substantially 
limits the major life activity of reproduction). 
 
The protections of the ADA extend to "qualified 
individuals" who are discriminated against because of their 
relationship or association with individuals who have a 
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known disability. 28 C.F.R. 35.130(g); compare 42 U.S.C. 
S 12112(b)(4) (Title I of ADA); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(III), at 
38 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 461 (Title I 
of ADA) (the ADA "protects persons who associate with 
persons with disabilities and who are discriminated against 
because of that association. This may include family, 
friends, and persons who provide care for persons with 
disabilities."). As the adoptive parents of Adam, John and 
Mary Doe have a close relationship entitling them to 
protection under the ADA. 
 
CYS's policy requires notification of and consent from the 
biological or custodial parents of HIV-negative foster 
children when placing those children in homes with HIV- 
positive individuals. The policy therefor e treats John and 
Mary Doe differently during the foster parent application 
process solely on the basis of Adam's HIV and AIDS. As a 
facial matter, then, the policy constitutes disability 
discrimination against the Does under the ADA. 
 
Nevertheless, the ADA allows disparate treatment in 
certain cases. In particular, the ADA r ecognizes that the 
goal of ending disability discrimination must be balanced 
against the health and safety risks that disabilities 
sometimes pose to others. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 648- 
49. Thus, the ADA contains a direct thr eat exception, which 
allows discrimination if a disability "poses a direct threat to 
the health or safety of others." 28 C.F.R. Part 35, App. A at 
483; compare 42 U.S.C. S 12182(b)(3) (Title III of ADA); see 
also 29 U.S.C. S 705(20)(D) (Rehabilitation Act). A "direct 
threat" exists when there is a "significant risk to the health 
or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a 
modification of polices, practices, or procedures or by the 
provision of auxiliary aids or services." 42 U.S.C. 
S 12182(b)(3) (emphasis added).6  As the Supreme Court has 
stated, the exception can only be invoked wher e a risk is 
significant: "[b]ecause few, if any, activities in life are risk 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The direct threat exception was a judicially created doctrine first 
announced in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 
287 n.16 (1987). Following that case, Congress amended the disability 
discrimination statutes to include the Court's dir ect threat language. 
See 
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 649. 
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free . . . the ADA do[es] not ask whether a risk exists, but 
whether it is significant." Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 649. Thus, 
courts and entities deciding whether to exclude the 
disabled must rely on evidence that "assess[es] the level of 
risk" for the "question under the statute is one of statistical 
likelihood." Id. at 652. 
 
To determine the existence of a significant risk, the 
Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline 
directed courts to make factual findings concerning the 
following four factors: 
 
       (a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is 
       transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long is 
       the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what 
       is the potential harm to third parties) and (d) the 
       probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will 
       cause varying degrees of harm. 
 
480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987) (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). These findings must be based on "medical or 
other objective evidence," with special defer ence to the 
views of public health authorities. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 
649. 
 
In the leading Supreme Court case, Bragdon v. Abbott, a 
dentist refused to treat a patient with HIV, believing the 
patient might infect him. Addressing the dentist's 
invocation of the ADA's direct threat exception, the Court 
conducted a rigorous and individualized inquiry into the 
risk of HIV transmission from patient to dentist. Id. at 650- 
54 (scrutinizing the details of studies and other cited 
authorities). Despite the existence of a theor etically possible 
means of transmission from patient to dentist, the Court 
remanded the case to "permit a full exploration of the 
issue" of risk of transmission given the Court's"analysis of 
some of the studies cited by the parties." Id. at 655 (dentist 
argued that he might be infected by HIV -positive patient 
through airborne blood vapors or thr ough an accidental 
cut). In doing so, the Court did "not for eclose the possibility 
that the Court of Appeals [might] reach the same 
conclusion it did earlier" in holding that ther e was no 
significant risk to the dentist. Id.; see Abbott v. Bragdon, 
163 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 1998) (finding no significant risk 
on remand), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1131 (1999). 
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The disposition in Bragdon follows fr om Congress' intent 
that the ADA's prohibitions on disability discrimination 
require an individualized determination as to the 
significance of risk underlying the direct threat exception, 
both by entities evaluating disabilities and by courts 
judging the actions of those entities: 
 
       A person with a disability must not be excluded . . . 
       based on stereotypes or fear. Nor may a decision be 
       based on speculation about the risk or harm to others. 
       Decisions are not permitted to be based on 
       generalizations about the disability but rather must be 
       based on the facts of an individual case. . . The purpose 
       of creating the `direct thr eat' standard is to eliminate 
       exclusions which are not based on objective evidence 
       about the individual involved. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(III), at 45 (1990), r eprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 468 (emphasis added); see also Holiday 
v. City of Chattanooga, 206 F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that a district court erred in accepting a 
physician's report about the abilities of an HIV-positive 
police officer applicant where "ther e [was] no indication that 
the physician conducted the individualized inquiry 
mandated by the ADA"); Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 
177 F.3d 180, 192-93 (3d Cir. 1999) (employers must make 
individualized determinations about the disabilities of 
employees); Doe v. Dekalb County Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 
1441, 1446 (11th Cir. 1998) (the Supr eme Court "insist[s] 
that district courts undertake `individualized inquiry' in 
each case" regarding the significance of risk). 
 
In ruling against the Does' disability discrimination 
claims, the District Court accepted the County's ar gument 
that Adam's HIV posed a significant risk to foster children 
placed in the Does' home. The direct thr eat exception 
therefore applied, justifying the County's policy. While 
acknowledging that the probability of transmission might 
be low during a specific sexual act, the Court stated that it 
was "unaware of any way of assuring that contact between 
[Adam and a foster child] will be indeed casual," and that 
if not casual, there would be a chance that HIV - 
transmitting sexual intercourse might take place. Doe II, 80 
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F. Supp. 2d at 443 (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). 
 
In an effort to follow Arline and Bragdon, the District 
Court based its significance of risk conclusion on four 
findings of fact. As to the nature of the risk, it found that 
"the HIV virus has been proven to be transmitted through 
sexual intercourse (homosexual or heter osexual), 
intravenous drug use, and transfusion of blood and blood 
products." Doe I, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 428. As to the duration 
of the risk, it found that "AIDS is a ter minal disease for 
which there is no cure. . . . [T]he risk [is] present until the 
carrier succumbs to the disease." Id. W ith respect to the 
severity of the risk, it found that "[t]he harm to third 
parties is life-threatening." Id. W e agree that there is no 
genuine dispute regarding these findings. 
 
Most of the tension in this case, however, surrounds the 
fourth and final factor -- the probability of transmission. As 
to this factor, the District Court agr eed with the County, 
and found "a high probability that [HIV] will be transmitted 
[through sexual contact] to childr en placed in foster care 
with the Does." Id. at 428. With r espect to this factor, we 
cannot agree with the District Court because we conclude 
that there is definitely a genuine dispute of fact. It is 
obvious from the record that Adam's physical limitations 
prevent him from being a sexual aggr essor. The District 
Court must have derived its conclusion regar ding the 
probability of transmission from the possibility of a sexual 
misdeed by a foster child, reasoning that: (1) given the data 
provided by CYS officials, CYS foster childr en have a high 
propensity to sexually abuse other childr en, see Doe II, 80 
F. Supp. 2d at 441; and (2) according to testimony by Carol 
Smith, "CYS cannot identify with any certainty at the time 
of placement which of its foster children will engage in 
assaultive behavior or those children who will be sexual 
perpetrators," id. at 442 (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). 
 
We believe that the reasoning the County and the District 
Court employed is contrary to Congress' intent that 
analysis of the ADA's direct threat exception should involve 
an individualized inquiry into the significance of the threat 
posed. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 649. In concluding that 
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CYS foster children have a high propensity for sexual 
abuse, the District Court relied on a bland and generalized 
set of statistics, lacking in individual specificity. These 
statistics reveal that 12% of the foster childr en have had 
histories of perpetrating some form of "sexual abuse," but 
the statistics broadly define "sexual abuse" to include 
activities such as fondling and disrobing that carry no risk 
of transmitting HIV. Does II, 80 F . Supp. 2d at 441. More 
important, the statistics do not indicate how many children 
can be readily identified as being unable or unlikely to 
engage in high-risk behavior. 
 
The following example illustrates this point. The Does 
have stated a preference for foster childr en under the age of 
12. Foster children of tender age -- i.e., infants and 
children who have not reached puberty-- are extremely 
unlikely to commit forcible sexual inter course leading to the 
transmission of HIV.7 Mor eover, as noted there is no 
evidence indicating that Adam is at all likely to commit 
such an assault, and much evidence suggesting that this is 
most unlikely. Thus, we believe that the probability of HIV 
transmission from Adam to a tender-aged child placed in 
the Does' home appears to be insignificant. Mor eover, 
contrary to Carol Smith's testimony, such children are 
precisely the type of children whom CYS can identify as 
unlikely perpetrators of HIV-transmitting sexual assault. 
 
The County argues that even though the pr obability of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We use "tender age" only as helpful terminology for defining a range 
of sexual development. In doing so, we are not drawing on any legal 
definition of tender years or age, but rather on the practical physical 
limits of pre-pubescent children. In fact, we note that the definition of 
the phrase "children of tender years" has varied in social and legal 
contexts, with little direct connection to sexual development. See, e.g., 
Black's Law Dictionary 1480 (7th ed. 1999) (in family law, the tender 
years doctrine provides "that custody of very young children (usu[ally] 
five years of age and younger) should generally be awarded to the mother 
in a divorce unless she is found to be unfit"); Robert G. Marks, Note, 
Should We Believe the People Who Believe the Children?: The Need for a 
New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay Exception Statute, 32 Harv. J. 
on Legis. 207, 245-46 (1995) (noting that all states limit their tender 
years statutes to children below a certain age, and arguing that some of 
the age limits are too low). 
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transmission is negligible, a generalized policy is justified 
where a disability, such as HIV, is deadly and has no cure, 
because the loss of even one life is too great a cost in 
pursuit of the ADA's honorable goals. Admittedly, when 
facing the life-threatening consequences of HIV , some 
federal appellate courts have held that any amount of risk 
through a "specific and theoretically sound means of 
transmission" constitutes a significant risk, allowing 
invocation of the direct threat exception. Onishea v. Hopper, 
171 F.3d 1289, 1297-99 (11th Cir. 1999) (allowing 
segregation of HIV-positive prisoners), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 
1114 (2000); see also Estate of Mauro v. Borgess Med. Ctr., 
137 F.3d 398, 405, 407 (6th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary 
judgment against HIV-positive surgical technician even 
though Centers for Disease Control calculated odds of 
transmission during a surgery as between 1 in 42,000 and 
1 in 420,000); Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 
1261, 1265-66 (4th Cir. 1995) (affir ming summary 
judgment against HIV-positive physician wher e the risk of 
transmission was "minimal but nevertheless 
ascertainable"); Bradley v. Univ. of T ex. M.D. Anderson 
Cancer Ctr., 3 F.3d 922, 924 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) 
(affirming summary judgment in favor of hospital that 
refused to permit an HIV-positive surgical assistant to 
assist surgeries, even though risk was "small"). 
 
Other appellate courts have endorsed a more exacting 
standard, requiring some actual risk of transmission 
including documented cases. See Abbott, 163 F.3d at 90 
(finding that plaintiff HIV-positive dental patient produced 
sufficient evidence that there would be no significant threat 
to dentist from treatment); Chalk v. United States Dist. 
Court Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701, 707-09, 712 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (directing entry of pr eliminary injunction 
prohibiting school from transferring teacher with HIV from 
classroom because uncertain and theoretical possibility of 
HIV transmission to students did not present significant 
risk, despite district court's characterization of the potential 
harm as "catastrophic"). 
 
We need not decide the merits of these two positions 
since, even under the more cautious rule, a r easonable fact 
finder could find that there is no "specific and theoretically 
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sound means of [HIV] . . . transmission" fr om Adam to a 
tender-aged foster child. Onishea, 171 F.3d at 1297. In 
light of the objective medical evidence in the r ecord, a 
reasonable fact finder could easily find that the risk of a 
little boy or girl contracting HIV from Adam by forcing him 
to engage in high-risk behavior is the type of r emote and 
speculative risk that is insufficient for a finding of 
significant risk, and insufficient for the invocation of the 
direct threat exception. See Bragdon , 524 U.S. at 649 (in 
assessing whether patient with HIV presented a significant 
risk to dentist, "Arline and the ADA do not ask whether a 
risk exists, but [rather] whether it is significant"); see also 
H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(II), at 56 (1990), r eprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 338 (Title I of ADA) (noting that a 
"speculative or remote risk" is insufficient to support a 
finding of a "significant risk"), H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(III), at 
46 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 469 (Title I 
of ADA) ("The plaintiff is not requir ed to prove that he or 
she poses no risk"). 
 
Its original sexual assault justification faltering, the 
County turns to another, contending that physical 
roughhousing or fighting between Adam and a foster child 
of tender age could still lead to the transmission of HIV. We 
reject this contention. Even if we accept the less than 
obvious proposition that a young child or infant could 
physically assault Adam, a reasonable factfinder could 
find, based on the objective medical evidence in the record, 
that the risk of HIV transmission from casual contact, even 
intense physical contact, is negligible. 
 
Furthermore, the County's sexual assault and physical 
violence arguments lose all force in the case of a foster 
child who is so disabled that he or she is simply incapable 
of committing sexual or physical assault.8  In such a 
situation, the County's blanket policy discriminates against 
the Does because of Adam's HIV positive status even 
though the probability of HIV transmission, and 
consequently the risk, is next to zero. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We believe there are such handicapped foster children. After all, the 
record demonstrates that Adam himself was a physically disabled foster 
child before being adopted by the Does. 
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In sum, the record is insufficient to support the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the County, because a 
reasonable fact finder could not find, based on the 
summary judgment record, that an individual with HIV 
would always pose a significant risk to a foster child placed 
by the County in that individual's home. This generalization 
fails to address, for example, the placement of tender-aged 
and disabled foster children. The County ther efore failed to 
conduct the ADA-mandated individualized deter mination, 
and the District Court erred in concluding that the ADA's 
direct threat exception applied. 
 
In addition to its significance of risk ar guments under 
Arline and Bragdon, the County has pr esented several other 
justifications for the policy. First, and most persuasively, 
the County argues that the direct thr eat test in Arline and 
Bragdon developed in the context of HIV-positive persons 
rightfully demanding inclusion into the public spher e and 
into public life. See, e.g., Abbott, 163 F.3d at 90 (holding 
that HIV-positive dental patient was entitled to dental 
treatment); Chalk, 840 F.2d at 708-09, 712 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that school could not transfer teacher with HIV 
from classroom). The present case, by contrast, involves an 
HIV-positive family requesting the placement of a non-HIV 
positive child into their private home. The County argues 
that this is a novel situation, demanding mor e stringent 
standards since the threat posed in a private home is much 
greater. 
 
We have found no authority on this issue. W e 
acknowledge the intuitive difference between inclusion into 
the public sphere and placement in a private home. A 
private home is much more difficult to monitor and involves 
more intimate contact than would ordinarily take place in 
the public sphere, such as at a school or within a hospital. 
Further, as compared to the HIV-positive person seeking 
inclusion, the HIV-negative child and his or her guardians 
lack choice in the foster placement process. In addition, 
entities responsible for foster placement, such as the 
County, normally have an independent statutory directive 
to ensure that the placement of children is safe. See, e.g., 
23 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 6344. Nevertheless, the differences 
suggested, while possibly significant in some cases, cannot 
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justify the type of blanket policy implemented her e. Simply 
put, the distinction between the public spher e and a private 
home, which relates primarily to monitoring and intimacy, 
has no material effect on the significance of risk analysis 
for tender-aged and disabled foster childr en who, by their 
inherent physical limitations, face negligible risk from an 
HIV-positive child such as Adam, whether in the public 
sphere or private home. 
 
Second, the County argues that its policy is analogous to 
the legal concept of informed consent, which r equires that 
physicians, before performing any medical procedure, 
provide patients with information about the potential risks 
of the procedure to the health and safety of the patient. Doe 
I, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 429-30 (employing this argument). The 
analogy is inappropriate here. No pr ovision of the ADA 
incorporates the concept of informed consent, and we see 
no basis for engrafting that concept onto the statutory 
scheme. 
 
Third, the County argues that the particular 
circumstances of the Does' family situation would compel 
CYS to deny foster placement anyway, even in the absence 
of the policy. In particular, the County is concerned with 
family instability if Adam is hospitalized or has increased 
needs, an event that might reduce the level of care to a 
foster child. The problem with this argument is that the 
County, by virtue of its application of the policy to the 
Does, never reached this evaluative stage. Mor eover, the 
record contradicts the County's assertions. Adam's 
condition is stable. He has good health and faces no greater 
risk of infection than a child without HIV. T o the extent the 
County enacts a policy based on the belief that HIV , as a 
general matter, causes instability, it again controverts the 
ADA-mandate of individualized determination. The 
instability argument further rings hollow given that the 
County does not require disclosure of other stability 
threatening conditions, such as cancer or neur ological 
problems. 
 
Finally, the County argues that making accommodations 
for the Does will be difficult and resour ce-intensive given 
the realities of foster care. Specifically, the County contends 
that placements are often made under emer gency time 
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constraints with inadequate time for evaluation. Placing 
young children with the Does, according to the County, 
could also be psychologically damaging if those children 
need to be moved at a later time due to their sexual 
development. This argument, however, again ignores the 
principle of individualized evaluation. After all, not every 
placement will be an emergency, and not every child will 
need to be moved. 
 
For the reasons stated, we will reverse its grant of 
summary judgment on the Does' claims of disability 
discrimination. We emphasize that, while we have used 
tender-aged and disabled foster childr en to illustrate the 
shortcomings of the County's policy, our holding does not 
foreclose the possibility of placing other foster children with 
the Does, so long as there is no significant risk. 
 
Given our decision, we need not consider the Does' 
further arguments that the District Court impr operly 
converted the County's motion to dismiss and that it erred 
in not deferring summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(f) until the completion of discovery. See Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b) (on conversion, "all parties shall be given 
reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56"); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 
56(f); Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Pr ods., Inc., 930 F.2d 




With respect to the Does' claims of racial discrimination 
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 
S 1983, the District Court granted summary judgment to 
the County. Reasoning that the Does' foster par ent 
application had not yet been approved and that CYS had 
not yet denied referral of a foster child to the Does on any 
grounds, the District Court concluded that the Does' racial 
discrimination claims were not ripe. See Doe II, 80 F. Supp. 
2d at 446. On appeal, the Does argue that the District 
Court erred. We exercise plenary r eview over whether a 
cause of action is ripe. Felmeister v. Office of Attorney 
Ethics, 856 F.2d 529, 535 n.8 (3d Cir . 1988). Upon review, 
we conclude that the District Court's ripeness 
determination was incorrect. 
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The ripeness doctrine helps determine whether a dispute 
or claim has matured to a point warranting judicial 
intervention. 13A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & 
Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure S 3532 
(2d ed. 1984). The doctrine exists "to pr event the courts, 
through avoidance of premature adjudication, from 
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over 
administrative policies, and also to protect . . . agencies 
from judicial interference until an administrative decision 
has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by 
the challenging parties." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 
387 U.S. 136, 148-149 (1967), overruled on other grounds, 
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977). T o evaluate 
ripeness, we must look at the "fitness of the issues for 
judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of 
withholding court consideration." Id. at 149. "A claim is not 
ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future 
events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may 
not occur at all." Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 
(1998) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
 
Here, the record shows ripe claims. The County enacted 
the infectious disease policy, and, on December 18, 1998, 
sent a letter informing the Does that they would not be 
approved as foster parents without disclosure of Adam's 
HIV status and without consent of the parents of any 
prospective foster child. During the application process, 
CYS officials allegedly made statements that might support 
an inference of underlying racial motivations-- in 
particular, Rice allegedly stated that the HIV issue was to 
some degree irrelevant given the lack of racially suitable 
foster children. 
 
The District Court erroneously focused on the alleged 
denial of placement as the Does' sole claim. Besides 
alleging an improper denial, the Does alleged that the 
County imposed discriminatory restrictions on the process 
itself, in part because of racism engendered by the Does' 
interracial relationship. This allegation, while disputed by 
the County, does not constitute an "abstract 
disagreement[ ]" incapable of judicial resolution. See, e.g., 
Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 148. Withholding judicial 
consideration causes an immediate and significant 
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hardship on the Does, who will be deprived of their right to 
present their federal statutory and constitutional claims for 
redress. Therefore, we hold that the racial discrimination 
claims are ripe.9 Accor dingly, we will reverse summary 





In this action, the Does sued CYS officials W atson, Smith, 
and Rice in their individual capacities, seeking to impose 
liability and personal damages. The officials claimed 
qualified immunity from suit. The District Court agreed, 
holding that qualified immunity applied because the Does 
failed to show that the individual officials' conduct violated 
rights clearly established at the time the conduct occurred. 
Doe II, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 445. The Does appeal this 
determination, and we have plenary review. Elder v. 
Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 516 (1994). We agree with the 
District Court. 
 
The doctrine of qualified immunity "hold[s] that 
government officials performing discretionary functions 
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar 
as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a r easonable 
person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800, 818 (1982). The doctrine recognizes "the need to 
protect officials who are requir ed to exercise their discretion 
and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous 
exercise of official authority." Id.  at 807 (internal quotations 
and citation omitted). 
 
In determining whether the individual CYS officials are 
entitled to claim qualified immunity, we engage in a three- 
part inquiry: (1) whether the plaintiffs alleged a violation of 
their statutory or constitutional rights; (2) whether the right 
alleged to have been violated was clearly established in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We express no view as to whether there is sufficient evidence in the 
summary judgment record to support a claim that the defendants were 
motivated by racial considerations or that any such considerations had 
any determinative effect on the proceedings concerning the plaintiffs. 
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existing law at the time of the violation; and (3) whether a 
reasonable official should have known that the alleged 
action violated the plaintiffs' rights. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 
F.3d 192, 196-97 (3d Cir. 1999). Under the first part of the 
inquiry, the Does allege a violation of their federal statutory 
and constitutional rights. The second and thir d parts are 
related, and involve an inquiry into the "objective legal 
reasonableness" of an official's action, assessed in light of 
legal rules that were "clearly established" at the time the 
officials took the action. Anderson v. Cr eighton, 483 U.S. 
635, 639 (1987) (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
Rights may be clearly established even though the pr ecise 
conduct at issue has not yet been declared unlawful. See 
id. at 640. Throughout the inquiry, the officials' subjective 
intent is irrelevant. See id. at 639. 
 
The Supreme Court has directed that the right in 
question should be defined in a particularized and relevant 
manner, rather than abstractly. See id.  at 640. Therefore, 
we define the right in question as the right of HIV-positive 
individuals and related persons to be fr ee from generalized 
discrimination when public agencies place HIV -negative 
individuals into their HIV-positive private homes. To defeat 
qualified immunity, this right must have been sufficiently 
clear such that a reasonable official would have known that 
enacting and applying the County's policy would have 
violated the right. See id. at 640. 
 
To the contrary, however, the placement of HIV-negative 
children into HIV-positive private homes presents a novel 
legal issue. As we noted earlier, federal cases involving HIV 
and disability discrimination nearly universally deal with 
access to the public sphere, rather than placement into 
private contexts, such as homes or residences. Of the 
Pennsylvania county policies we have reviewed in this case, 
only one directly applies to the right in question, and then 
only in general terms. Children and Y outh Div., Phila. Dep't 
of Human Servs., Policy Manual SS 1010, 5200. 
 
In addition to the novelty of the issue, CYS officials had 
a separate legal duty to protect the health of foster 
children. See, e.g., 23 Pa. Cons. Stat.S 6344. As a legal 
matter, the interplay between this duty and the ADA's 
prohibition of generalized determinations under the direct 
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threat exception was unclear when the policy was drafted. 
This is especially true given that there exists authority 
supporting the proposition that HIV-positive individuals 
may be segregated from HIV-negative individuals under the 
direct threat exception even where the possibility of 
transmission is low. See, e.g., Onishea , 171 F.3d 1289 
(segregation of HIV-positive prisoners in the prison context); 
Estate of Mauro, 137 F.3d 398 (limiting activities of HIV- 
positive surgical technician); Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 
50 F.3d 1261 (limiting activities of an HIV -positive 
physician); Bradley, 3 F.3d 922 (limiting activities of a HIV- 
positive surgical assistant). For these r easons, we conclude 
that the right in question was not clearly established such 
that a reasonable official would have known that the policy 
violated the ADA, and we will therefore affirm the District 
Court's holding that the CYS officials had qualified 




The Does' final argument on appeal is that the District 
Court erred in holding that the County gover nment entities 
-- Centre County, CYS, and the County Boar d -- are 
immune from punitive damages in suits under T itle II of the 
ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.10 We 
exercise plenary review over this legal issue. 
 
The Does seek punitive damages from the County 
government entities under Title II of the ADA, Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. S 1983. As to 
S 1983, City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., stands for the 
proposition that municipalities, and mor e broadly, state 
and local governments entities, are immune from punitive 
damages under that statute. 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). The 
issue presented here is whether the District Court correctly 
extended the holding of City of Newport, to suits brought 




10. In order to address the Does' ar guments, we must depart from 
previous practice in this opinion and r efer separately to Title II of the 
ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 
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We have not found any federal appellate court opinions 
that have addressed this issue. The district courts that 
have addressed it are divided, some holding that punitive 
damages are available against municipalities under Title II 
and Section 504, and some holding that they ar e not. 
Compare, e.g., Dadian v. Village of Wilmette, No. 98-C-3731, 
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6846, at *9-10 (N.D. Ill. May 4, 
1999) (punitive damages available); Purcell v. Pennsylvania 
Dep't of Corr., No. 95-6720, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105, at 
*34-39 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1998) (same); DeLeo v. City of 
Stamford, 919 F. Supp. 70, 74 (D. Conn. 1995) (same); 
Penney v. Town of Middleton, 888 F . Supp. 332, 342 
(D.N.H. 1994) (refusing to dismiss S 504 punitive damages 
claim but not definitively deciding the issue); with Adelman 
v. Dunmire, No. 95-4039, 1996 WL 107853, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 
Mar. 12, 1996) (punitive damages unavailable). 
 
Our analysis begins with City of Newport. In holding that 
a municipality is immune from punitive damages under 42 
U.S.C. S 1983, the Supreme Court r easoned that, at the 
time Congress enacted the statute that is nowS 1983, it 
was generally understood in common law that a 
municipality "was to be treated as a natural person subject 
to suit for a wide range of tortious activity, but this 
understanding did not extend to the award of punitive or 
exemplary damages." City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 259-60 
(footnote omitted). The common law rule developed fr om a 
reluctance to punish innocent taxpayers and bankrupt 
local governments because of the actions of a few miscreant 
public officials. Id. at 266. ReviewingS 1983, the Court 
found no indications, in the common law or legislative 
history, that Congress intended to abolish the doctrine of 
municipal immunity from punitive damages. Id. at 259-66. 
 
The Supreme Court also looked to public policy. It 
reasoned that the rationales underlying punitive damages 
did not support exposing a municipality to such damages 
for the bad faith actions of its officials. First, since 
municipal officials, rather than municipalities, were the 
wrongdoers, sanctioning municipalities would not advance 
the retributive purpose of S 1983. Id. at 267-68. Second, 
the Court believed that it was unlikely that municipal 
officials would be deterred from wr ongdoing by large 
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punitive damages awarded against municipalities. And, in 
any case, a more effective deterr ent existed in the 
possibility of awarding punitive damages dir ectly against 
officials and their personal finances. Id.  at 269-70. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court noted the high costs of 
expanded damages remedies under federal statutory and 
constitutional law, costs that might threaten the financial 
integrity of local governments. Id. at 270. Since City of 
Newport, the principle that municipalities ar e immune to 
punitive damages under S 1983 has been extended to other 
government entities. See, e.g., Bolden v. Southeastern Pa. 
Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 830 (3d Cir. 1991) (extending 
the rule to regional authorities). 
 
The principles derived from City of Newport  are directly 
applicable to the present case. When Congr ess enacted Title 
II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, it 
knew of the common law rule precluding punitive damages 
against municipalities. Therefore, under the City of Newport 
framework, the question is whether Congress intended to 
disturb that settled common-law immunity. 
 
To be sure, an opposing principle exists. Namely, the 
Supreme Court in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public 
Schools directed courts to "presume the availability of all 
appropriate remedies [for a federal right of action] unless 
Congress has expressly indicated otherwise." 503 U.S. 60, 
66 (1992). For example, relying on the Franklin 
presumption of remedies and the lack of congressional 
expression to the contrary, the Fourth Cir cuit held in 
Pandazides v. Virginia Board of Education, an employment 
case in which the sole defendant was a state boar d of 
education, that the plaintiff could seek punitive damages 
under Section 504. 13 F.3d 823, 830-32 (4th Cir. 1994) (full 
panoply of legal remedies available, including punitive 
damages in suit against employer); see also Pur cell, 1998 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105, at *34-39 (following similar 
reasoning); cf. Schultz v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of the 
United States, 139 F.3d 286, 291 (1st Cir. 1998) (suggesting 
that, in a suit under Section 504, "damages for emotional 
distress [might] be justified to punish patent misbehavior or 
the deliberate infliction of humiliation"); but see Moreno v. 
Consol. Rail Corp., 99 F.3d 782, 790-92 (6th Cir. 1996) (en 
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banc) (holding that, based on the lack of congressional 
intent to override existing punitive damage norms, Section 
504 does not allow punitive damages). 
 
We believe, however, that the analysis underlying 
Franklin, and employed in Pandazides, does not control in 
this case. The Franklin presumption is rooted in the 
common law principle, recognized by the Supr eme Court as 
early as Marbury v. Madison, that a right without a remedy 
is not a right at all. See 503 U.S. at 66-67 (citing numerous 
authorities). Prior to Franklin, some courts had held that 
monetary damages were unavailable in suits br ought under 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. See 503 
U.S. at 64-65. The Franklin Court settled this dispute, 
holding that monetary damages were available. In the 
present case, the principle of Franklin has limited 
applicability since, irrespective of the availability of punitive 
damages against municipalities, several other monetary 
remedies are available to enforce the rights in Title II and 
Section 504. Limiting punitive damages will not r ender 
those rights meaningless. Moreover, insofar as the rules of 
Franklin and City of Newport conflict, the reasonable way to 
reconcile them is to give effect to the narrower rule in the 
latter. Cf. Morales v. Trans W orld Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 
374, 384 (1992) (in statutory construction, "the specific 
governs the general"). After all, the issue here is not the 
general availability of damage remedies, but rather the 
specific availability of punitive damages against 
municipalities. In these circumstances, City of Newport tells 
us to assume that Congress intended to r etain common law 
immunity, unless there is a clear expression of 
congressional intent to the contrary. See  453 U.S. at 263- 
64. 
 
Title II and Section 504 incorporate by r eference the 
enforcement scheme found in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. S 12133 (T itle II incorporates 
enforcement scheme in Section 505 of the Rehabilitation 
Act); 29 U.S.C. S 794a(a)(2) (Section 504 and 505 of the 
Rehabilitation Act adopt the remedies available under Title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Therefor e, we may look 
for congressional intent in Title II and Section 504, as well 
as in Title VI. On their face, however , neither Title II nor 
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Section 504 indicate a congressional intent to override 
municipal immunity to punitive damages. Likewise, support 
for the availability of punitive damages against 
municipalities cannot come from Title VI since the general 
view is that punitive damages are not available, in any 
form, under that statute. Moreno , 99 F.3d at 790 (citing 
numerous cases). 
 
Nevertheless, the Does argue that the Rehabilitation Act 
Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, 100 Stat. 1807 
(1986), demonstrate Congress' intent to eliminate municipal 
immunity from punitive damages in suits under T itle II and 
Section 504. Title X, section 1003, of the Rehabilitation Act 
Amendments of 1986, entitled "Civil Rights Remedies 
Equalization," abrogates the states' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity from, among other things, suits under Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. S 2000d-7. In particular, the 
Civil Rights Remedies Equalization provision states that, 
"[i]n a suit against a State for a violation of [these statutes] 
. . . remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) 
are available . . . to the same extent as such remedies are 
available for such a violation in the suit against any public 
or private entity other than a State." 42 U.S.C.S 2000d- 
7(a)(2). The Does construe the Equalization pr ovision as a 
broad grant of remedies, evidencing Congr ess' intent that 
punitive damages should be available against 
municipalities. We disagree with the Does' interpretation. 
The provision only states that the remedies available 
against a state government would be the same as those 
already available against an entity other than a state. It 
says nothing more about punitive damages. 
 
Another argument suggested by the Does hinges on the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 
1071 (1991). That act expressly amended T itle I of the ADA 
(employment discrimination) to allow awards of punitive 
damages against individuals and private entities, but not 
against municipalities and government entities. 42 U.S.C. 
S 1981a(b)(1). The act did not amend T itle II. One district 
court has reasoned that the amendment of T itle I, without 
change to Title II, shows that Congress intended not only to 
prohibit punitive damages against municipalities in the 
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employment context under Title I, but also to allow punitive 
damages against municipalities under Title II. See generally 
Purcell, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105, at *34-39. We decline to 
draw such a broad inference of congr essional intent, 
especially where numerous explanations for the lack of 
amendment to Title II are possible. Compare, e.g., id. at 
*36-38 (lack of amendment to Title II indicates availability 
of punitive damages); with Harrelson v. Elmore County, 859 
F. Supp. 1465, 1468-69 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (lack of 
amendment to Title II "counsels against a statutory 
construction that punitive damages are available"). 
 
In summary, we find that Title II of the ADA and Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act lack any indicia of Congress' 
intent to override the settled common law immunity of 
municipalities from punitive damages. In addition, just as 
in the S 1983 context, notions of retribution and deterrence 
provide weak support for awarding punitive damages 
against dispassionate municipal government entities, rather 
than offending officials. See City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 
267-70. Awarding such damages also thr eatens the 
financial integrity of local governments. Id. at 270. Given 
these considerations, we believe that City of Newport should 
apply with equal force to suits under T itle II of the ADA and 
under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Consequently, 
the Does may not recover punitive damages fr om the 




For all these reasons, we will reverse the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment against the Does on their 
claims of disability discrimination and remand for further 
discovery and factual findings. We will also reverse the 
District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
County on the Does' racial discrimination claims and 
remand for further proceedings. Lastly, we will affirm the 
District Court's conclusions that the CYS officials are 
entitled to qualified immunity and that punitive damages 
are unavailable against the County entities. 
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